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Clouds Over International Lending 
Widespread concern over the risks associ-
ated with international lending by banks has 
lately been triggered by the unstable political 
situation in Poland, the Falklands War and, 
more recently, the emergence of Mexico's 
debt-servicing problems. The concern cli-
maxed at the Joint Annual Meetings of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank in Toronto in early September. Since 
then, although the worst of the storm has 
blown over, dark clouds linger and serious 
concern over the potential threat of major 
national defaults to the stability of the inter-
national banking system remains. 
In the following, we shall discuss the subject 
with four questions in mind: (1) What are the 
facts behind the concern? (2) What are the 
causes of  the present situation? (3) What does 
the future hold? and (4) What safeguards are 
there against a potential international bank-
ing crisis? 
Basis for concern 
Although the press has exhaustively reported 
the basis for worry, it is useful to sort through 
the facts and pinpoint the areas of concern. 
Primary among these is the rapid expansion 
in recent years of loans to the less-developed 
countries (LDCs). One estimate reports that 
debts of non-OPEC LDCs doubled between 
1978 and 1982, from $350 to $700 billion. 
About half of  this debt is owed to banks and 
much of the debt is concentrated in about a 
dozen countries, many of which have found 
it difficult to service their debts on schedule. 
The number of countries that rescheduled 
debts rose from 2 or 3 a year in the 1970s to 6 
in 1980 and 20 in 1982. The total amount 
reschedu led rose from an average $1 .3 bi I-
lion a year in the 1970s to $28 billion in 
1982. All these countries had to put off 
repaying the principal; a few could not even 
pay the interest. 
Rescheduling their debts was necessary 
because the borrowing countries were obli-
gated to repay more than they were able to. 
The debt-servicing problem reached serious 
proportions in a number of  countries this 
year. For instance, Morgan Guaranty's World 
Financial Markets estimates that 1982 total 
external debt-servicing amounts to 179 per-
cent of Argentina's exports of goods and 
services, 129 percent of Mexico's, 122 per-
cent of Brazil's, 116 percent of  Chiie's, and 
95 percent of Venezuela's. These figures, 
however,  seriously  overstate  the  debt-
servicing problems as they include short-term 
debts which are customarily rolled over 
under normal circumstances. The portion of 
total debt made up of  short-term debts in each 
case is hard to say. In any event, even dis-
regarding the repayment of  principal, interest 
payments alone amount to 44 percent of 
Argentina's exports, 37 percent of Mexico's, 
and 45 percent of Brazil's. Since these 
countries had to pay for imports essential to 
their economies, debt rescheduling could not 
be avoided. 
The LDC debt-servicing problem is of con-
cern to many large U.5. and foreign banks. It 
has been reported that loans to several"prob-
lem" countries represent a high proportion of 
these banks' capital and reserves. Although, 
in the event of default, the banks could write 
off the loans over a number of years, defaults 
by several major borrowing countries could 
seriously erode their capital bases and trigger 
a general pan ic that wou  Id threaten the enti  re 
international banking system. 
Causes 
Before evaluating the likelihood of this 
scenario, it wi" be useful first to identify a 
number of developments that have led to the 
present situation. First, following the second 
oil-price increase in 1979-80, the world 
economy slid into a prolonged recession. The 
effects have been twofold: a fa" in the world 
demand for LDCs' exports, and a drop in the 
prices of  primary products which many LDCs 
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first oil shock of 1973-74 when, after a sharp 
but short recession, the world economy 
recovered strongly with the help of  a long and' 
vigorous expansion in the United States. 
The difference this time is thatthe U.S. and all 
the major industrial countries have made the 
fight against inflation their first priority. The 
short-term cost has been widespread reces-
sion and unemployment. In the process, the 
market for LDC exports shrank. Worse, the 
developed countries have also raised pro-
tective barriers against imports, especially 
those from the LDCs. 
Second, interest rates have climbed to histori-
cal heights in the developed countries. Euro-
dollar loan rates rose from an average of 8.5 
percent iin,1974-77-,to·18 percent i.n-l981,. 
When deflated by the U.s. inflation rate (GNP 
deflator), the real interest rate rose from a little 
over one percent in 1974-77 to nine percent 
in 1981. Such high interest rates have in-
creased the burden of interest payments for 
developing countries. High interest rates 
have also caused  borrowers to shift to short-
term credit in orderto avoid being locked into 
high-cost loans: But when previous' medium-
term credit arrangements become due, they 
"bunch up" against the new short-term 
obligations and create a liquidity crunch for 
borrowers. 
. Third, several LDCs have followed policies 
that made their problems worse. Some coun-
tries, for example, have maintained fixed 
exchange rates in the face of rapid domestic 
inflation. An overvalued currency discour-
ages the country's exports, encourages 
imports, and provides an incentive for specu-
lative capital outflow. The situation has also 
been aggravated by inappropriate domestic 
monetary policies that aim at maintaining 
unrealistically low interest rates in domestic 
financial markets for the purpose of encour-
aging domestic capital formation. Given the 
low domestic returns, capital has flowed 
abroad instead and made the countries even 
more dependent on foreign borrowings for 
domestic investments. 
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Finally, many banks abruptly cut off new 
credits to the LDCs having trouble repaying 
their debts. Morgan Guaranty reports that 
medium-term Euro-bank credits to LDCs 
dropped from $38 billion at an annual rate in 
the first half of  this year to only $16 billion in 
the third quarter. Individual banks must pro-
tect their own interests and determine what is 
most prudent for themselves. But, shou Id 
many of  them refuse to roll over credits to the 
borrowing countries, they would upset an 
already precarious situation for all banks. 
Prospects 
What about the future? The near threat of a 
few months ago has passed. The United 
States and other countries, underthe auspices 
of the Bank for International Settlements, 
acted.aecis,ively,and forcefully  to extend" ;;., i·, . 
emergency credits to Mexico to tidethe 
country over the short run. In addition, 
Argentina has agreed to settle with Britain in 
return for Britain's agreement to lift its freeze 
on $1  billion of Argentine assets in London 
banks. Brazil has recenty received a large 
new loan from the United States. Forthetime 
being, international waters are quiet. 
There are reasons to believe that the worst 
may be over and that things should look 
better in 1983. Falling oil prices, while 
hurting those countries for which oil is an 
important export, should help most others. 
Lower interest rates will help all the belea-
guered countries. And a recovery in the world 
economy-even a weak recovery will be 
better than none -shou  Id boost LDC export~ 
as well as primary commodity prices. Most 
important, the majority of the LDCs have 
already made serious adjustments in their 
economies by cutting the volume of imports, 
depreciating their currencies, and lowering 
output-growth rates. 
The current-account deficits of LDCs remain 
large in nominal magnitudes, but, for a num-
ber of major borrowing countries-
Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Korea-annual aver-
age deficits as a percent of  exports in 1981-82 
were considerably below those in 1974-75. The adjustment burden for these countries 
shou Id therefore be less now than it was in 
1974-75. 
However, to say that there is hope for 
improvement does not mean that no dangers 
lie ahead. For one, a large volume of LDC 
debts will come due next year ata timewhen 
the countries' economic conditions will not 
have improved sufficiently to enable them to 
service the debts. More reschedulings and 
requests for new credit will be needed. In one 
scenario, negotiations may be rough and 
even break down, payment arrears may 
increase, and banks may become alarmed 
and refuse further credit. 
Safeguards 
What hasibeen done or can be:done to avert 
potential threats to the international banking 
system? We can identify three lines of 
defense. 
First, the borrowing countries must be 
encouraged to adopt, and be assisted in 
adopting, appropriate economic policies for 
achieving further balance of payments 
adjustments. In many cases, austerity cannot 
be avoided, and unrealistic exchange rate 
and interest-rate policies must be aban-
doned. The countries can be helped in 
making the necessary adjustments with 
bilateral and multilateral official financial 
aids. The United States stands ready to extend 
aid to those cou ntries wi  II i  ng to undertake the 
necessary ad justments, as evidenced by the 
$1.23 billion short-term loan to Brazil 
announced by President Reagan on his recent 
tour of  Latin America. Brazil has, over  the last 
year and a half, pursued a vigorous program 
of belt-tightening to curb its balance of 
payments deficits. 
In addition to bilateral aid, international 
lending agencies such as the International' 
Monetary Fund have massive resources for 
aiding countries with temporary payments 
difficulties. In return for aid, these agencies 
ask for a commitment from the recipient 
countries to make appropriate adjustments in 
domestic economic policies. It is true that 
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many debtor countries have in the past 
balked at adopting tough policy measures for 
adjustment as a condition for aid. However, 
when faced with the harsh reality of the 
cessation of  all international credit (on which 
the normal functioning of  their economies 
depended), they nearly always made the 
required policy adjustments. 
Second, pol  icy ad justments take time to yield 
benefits. In the interim, lenders must recog-
nize that it is in their long-run interest to roll 
over their loans and, where appropriate, to 
extend new credits to countries with tempor-
ary payments difficulties. It is merely good 
business sense that they should do so. When, 
in a recession, many business firms find 
themselves in financial straits, banks almost 
never aba'ndorr their customers.'lnstead,AheYi:  .. ' 
strive to keep them afloat while reviewing 
their financial management practices. Simi-
larly, the world banking community has 
learned enough from past experiences with 
debt rescheduling to know how to assist 
debtor countries. Both the lenders and the 
debtors know that it is in their best interest to 
avert a crisis; neither can really afford to take 
the risk. This has, in the past, been the most 
effective defense. 
Nevertheless, future payments crises cannot 
be ruled out entirely. But even before the 
threat of  a major crisis develops into a general 
banking panic, the third line of  defense stands 
ready. National monetary authorities wou  Id 
carry out their lender-of-Iast-resort function 
through open-market operations or their dis-
count windows. This does not mean bailing 
out insolvent banks when they get into 
trouble becase of unwise management. 
Rather, it i  nvo  I  ves com  i  ng to the rescue when 
banks are threatened witha liquidity crisis as 
a result of general panic. Granted, in some 
cases, a hard line cannot be drawn between 
the two, but some say that it is the essence of 
the art of  central banking notto  draw  that line 
in advance-not to encourage banks to 
undertake undue risks, but to stand ready to 
provide the necessary assistance when it is 
needed. 
Hang-Sheng Cheng 1006 
BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts inmillions) 
Selected Assets and liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) -,-total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits ,.-total # 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits--total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 




































Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+ )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  + )/Net borrowed( - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
#  Includes items not shown separately. 
11/24/82  11 /17/82 
116  96 
0  14 
116  82 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
7,480  4.8 
8,781  6.6 
4,818  12.0 
2,025  3.7 
163  0.7 
589  30.4 
1,065  19.3 
2,366  - 15.4 
411  - 1.0 
220  0.8 
2,626  8.9 
10,989  12.5 
9,580  12.1 
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